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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-A "RA
TIONAL INTERPRETATION" OF Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
INTRODUCTION

The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 1 While freedom
of speech and of the press are guaranteed to all persons under the first
amendment, these rights are not absolute. 2 Although an active press is
"an indispensable component of a free and democratic society,"3 this
value must be balanced against an individual's interest in maintaining
his or her privacy or reputation. 4 In a libel action, these competing
interests come into conflict. s
While the majority of libel actions result from untrue statements
of fact, this conflict also arises in the context of quotations. When
quotation marks are used by a journalist, most readers understand that
they represent the speaker's actual words. Therefore, the use of quota
tion marks has not presented many problems for courts to resolve.
However, quotations present a special problem in the determination of
1. u.s. CoNST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in its entirety: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
2. In fact, at one time libelous speech was among "limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Conversely, Jus
tice Black proposed the idea, which has never commanded the support of a majority of the
Court, that the literal language of the first amendment should be given effect. By taking the
words "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press"
and interpreting "no law" strictly to require absolute protection of speech, Justice Black's
view completely eliminates the law of libel. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
§§ 48-49, at 244-47 (1978); R. LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (1963);
see also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation o/the First Amend
.
ment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (1965).
3. Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 282-83, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 280
(1980).
4. This interest "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered lib
erty." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
5. Upon analysis of the conflict between the law of libel and the first amendment, the
Court has stated that "[slome tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and
uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury." Gertz v. Rob
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
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liability in a libel action where a plaintiff claims that his or her own
words were deliberately altered.
"The author's job is not simply to copy statements verbatim;"6
inherent in the nature of reporting is the responsibility to interpret and
rework the statements into an article. 7 When the author paraphrases a
speaker's remarks, readers understand that they are reading the au
thor's interpretation of what was spoken. The question that remains
for the courts is whether a reporter should be given protection under
the first amendment to change a speaker's verbatim words, and then to
place that altered version within quotations. 8
Recently, in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,9 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a unique question involving
the appropriate approach to the actual malice standard in the context
of a misquotation. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that actual malice
could not be inferred from altered statements placed within quotations
as long as the purported quotes approximated what was said, or could
be seen as a rational interpretation of ambiguous remarks. to
This Note examines the rationale and impact of the Masson deci
sion, and addresses whether a court can infer that a reporter acted
with actual malice when evidence shows that statements placed in
quotation marks were altered or fabricated deliberately. Section I
briefly discusses the history and purposes of libel law, and examines
the policies behind placing constitutional limitations on libel law
through New York Times v. Sullivan 11 and its progeny. Section II de
scribes the Masson decision. Section III contains a critical analysis of
the Masson decision, and suggests that the rational interpretation stan
dard the court imposed was improper and inconsistent with the princi
ples of both libel and first amendment law.

6. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, 193 Conn. 313, 320, 477 A.2d 1005, 1009
(1984).
7. Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733 (4th Cir. 1980).
8. "The misquotation problem is a particularly important one when the story in
volves the assembling and editing of a substantial amount of quoted material." R.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.07[5], at 4-31 (1986); see Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing
Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 255, 167 N.B. 432, 433-34 (1929) ("In order to constitute a libel, it is
not necessary for the defendant ... to directly attack the plaintiff .... The same result is
accomplished by putting in her mouth or attaching to her pen words which make self
revelation of such a fact. ").
9. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, III S. Ct. 39 (1990).
10. Id. at 1539.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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BACKGROUND

History and Purposes of Libel Law

According to Dean Prosser, defamation consists of two torts, libel
and slander.12 The distinction between the two is that libel refers to
defamatory words that are written or printed while slander refers to
the oral communication of defamatory statements. 13 A defamatory
statement is one which harms the reputation of another. 14
The tort of libel has undergone significant changes since its origin.
This is due in part to the fact that the law of libel reflects an attempt to
accommodate two important yet conflicting interests: the integrity of
an individual's reputation, and the responsibility of the press to inform
citizens on matters of public concern. IS In order to understand fully
the significance of the Masson decision to the press and public, it is
necessary to look briefly at the history of libel which reflects the ten
sion between these two values. 16
In his treatise on tort law, Dean Prosser characterized defamation
as an "oddity of tort law" that developed according to no particular
plan,17 At common law, libel was a strict liability tort. 18 A defendant
could be found liable for publishing a false and defamatory statement
12. W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § Ill, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS].
13. Id.
14. A defamatory statement can be defined as a communication which tends "to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him [or her] in the estimate of the community
or to deter third persons from associating with him [or her]." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 559 (1965).
IS. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-making, 61
MINN. L. REv. 645, 645-46 (1977); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967). In Curtis, Justice Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of speech and
press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and
limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaran
teeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy." Id. at 152.
16. For a discussion of the history of libel, see Donnelly, History ofDefamation, 1949
WIS. L. REv. 99; Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law ofDefamation, 4 CoLUM. L.
REv. 33 (1904).
17. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 12, § 111, at 772. Dean Prosser stated:
It must be confessed ... that there is a great deal of the law of defamation
which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal
writer ever has had a kind word, and it is a curious compound of a strict liability
imposed upon innocent defendants ... with a blind and almost perverse refusal to
compensate the plaintiff for real and very serious harm.
Id. at 771-72 (footnote omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974) ("The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.").
18. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.0, at 3 (1986).
Dean Prosser, while discussing the common law of defamation stated:
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without any showing that the defendant acted unreasonably, or knew
or suspected that the statement was false. 19
The focus of the common law of libel was the protection of one's
good name and reputation in the community. The tradition of afford
ing a person the opportunity to vindicate his or her good name is evi
dent in modem defamation law, which has as its primary purpose the
protection of the plaintiff's reputation. 20
A second purpose of defamation law is compensation for harm
actually caused by the false statement. 21 A plaintiff often brings an
action for defamation for two purposes: to obtain both compensation
for the injury and public vindication of his or her reputation. 22 Addi
tionally, a successful defamation action serves a deterrent function,
namely, to punish a defendant who has acted outrageously, and
thereby deters others from publishing false statements. 23 Although
each jurisdiction has its own rules governing the law of libel, each ap
proach reflects the public policy of protecting individual reputations
from false and defamatory speech.24
The effect of ... strict liability is to place the printed, written or spoken word
in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.
If a defamatory meaning, which is false, is reasonably understood, the defendant
publishes at his peril, and there is no possible defense except the ... narrow one of
privilege.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 113, at 773 (4th ed. 1971).
19. Lord Mansfield's statement that "whenever a man publishes he publishes at his
peril" reflects the general attitude of the common law regarding defamatory remarks. See
The King v. Woodfall, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (K.B. 1774).
20. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 2, § 3, at 4. Modern defamation law is concerned with
protecting people from a wrongful disruption of the" 'relational interest' that an individual
has in maintaining personal esteem in the eyes of others." R. SMOLLA, supra note 8,
§ 1.06[1], at 1-15. Defamation law assumes that a person is entitled to have his or her
standing in the community unimpaired by defamatory statements. One scholar noted that
there are three separate concepts of reputation that the common law of libel sought to
protect: "reputation as property, as honor, and as dignity." Post, The Social Foundations
of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691,693 (1986).
21. L. ELDREDGE, supra nete 2, § 3, at 5; see also Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61
VA. L. REv. 1349, 1357-58 (1975); Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby:
A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1987).
22. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 2, § 3, at 6.
23. Id. The tort of libel has several purposes, including: (1) to compensate for ec0
nomic injury such as lost employment or dintinished business, (2) to deter the publication
of false and injurious speech, and (3) to provide a check and balance on the media's actions
by opening up the media's news-gathering and decision-making processes to public scrutiny
and accountability. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, § 1.06.
24. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974) (recognizing the legitimate state
interest of protecting reputation).
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B. Constitutional Limitations Imposed Upon Libel Law
Competing against the value of protecting reputational interests is
the value society places on free speech.2s However, prior to 1964, the
first amendment did not impose restrictions on the law of defamation.
The Supreme Court had made it clear that the constitutional protec
tion for freedom of speech did not include protection for libelous
utterance.26
In 1964, in what has been hailed a "landmark decision," the
United States Supreme Court first applied the limitations of the first
amendment to the law of libe}.27 In New York Times v. Sullivan,28 the
Court defined a zone of constitutional protection within which a jour
nalist can publish information without liability under state libel law.
The Court recognized the need to strike a balance between reputa
tional interests and the first amendment freedom of the press. 29
Although false statements of fact are not automatically protected by
the first amendment, the Court was concerned that holding the press
liable for a minor mistake of fact might deter reporting of truthful
information due to the fear and expense of litigation. 30 The Supreme
25. For a discussion of the first amendment, see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREE
DOM OF SPEECH § 2.05(C)(1) (1984) (stating "[t]he evil of defamation is self-evident, and
tort protection here requires no greater theoretical justification than does tort protection
against assault and battery, and other attacks upon the person").
26. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) ("[L]ibelous utterances are
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (Libelous speech is among the "funited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.").
27. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This decision has been
highly praised. In fact, one scholar noted that New York Times was "an occasion for danc
ing in the streets." Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
0/ the First Amendment", 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Professor
Meiklejohn). Kalven described the New York Times decision as one that "may prove to be
the best and most important [the Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of
speech." Id. at 193-94.
28. 376 U.S. 254.
29. Id. at 256. In SulliWJn, the New York Times ran a full page advertisement sup
porting Dr. Martin Luther King's efforts in the struggle for racial equality. Id. The action
stemmed from an allegedly libelous advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices,"
which praised the efforts of Southern Blacks in resisting racism. Id. The advertisement
contained a number of inaccuracies. One of the inaccuracies included a claim that a large
number of police officers "rang" the campus of the Alabama State College Campus in
Montgomery, when in fact they were just present near the campus. Id. at 259. In addition,
while the State Board of Education expelled nine students, they were not expelled for lead
ing the demonstration, but for demanding service at the lunch counter in the Montgomery
County Courthouse on another day. Id. Finally, Dr. King had been arrested on four pre
vious occasions, not seven times as reported in the advertisement. Id.
30. Id. at 279. Additionally, courts have given reporters procedural protection in a
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Court stated that erroneous statements are "inevitable in free debate,
and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.' "31
The standard enunciated in New York Times precludes a public
official from recovery for a defamatory statement criticizing his or her
official conduct "unless he [or she] proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."32 A plaintiff may
establish actual malice in one of two ways: by proving that the defend
ant had knowledge of the falsity of the statement, or by demonstrating
that the defendant published the statement with reckless disregard for
its truth. The actual malice standard focuses on the conduct and state
of mind of the journalist at the time of the publication.
In a series of subsequent cases, the United States Supreme Court
further defined and expanded the application of the actual malice stan
dard. The Court extended the actual malice test to public figures as
well as public officials in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,33 and the com
libel action through the use of summary judgment. A summary judgment proceeding has
been viewed as particularly important in a libel action and considered "the best procedural
protection" for first amendment rights. MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612
P.2d 830, 831 (Wyo. 1980). The courts are concerned that unfounded libel suits chill free
speech. The threat of a lawsuit may be just as chilling to the exercise of the first amend
ment as the fear of the outcome itself. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, § 12.07[1][b]. Proof
problems in court and the expense of litigation could turn journalists into self-censors and
deprive readers and viewers of access to vital information. Thus, granting the journalist the
extra procedural protection of summary judgment avoids some of the difficulties that a
journalist is faced with, such as self-censorship. Id.
For a discussion of the summary judgment proceeding in a libel case, see generally B.
SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LmGATION 520-30
(1985); Matheson, Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First
Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REv. 215, 285-99 (1987); Smolla, supra note 21.
31. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963». For a discussion of the "chilling effect," see generally Schauer, Fear, Risk and
the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978); Note,
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
32. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The actual malice standard of New York
Times has survived twenty-five years of exacting scrutiny, but there are many critics of this
standard. See generally Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking the
Bastion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 501 (1981); LeBel, Defama
tion and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 779, 788
89 (1984); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The
Central Meaning ofthe First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 623-25 (1983); Smolla,
Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel. 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1983); Yasser, Defamation as a Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malice for
All, 12 TULSA L.J. 601 (1977).
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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panion case of Associated Press v. Walker.34 Later, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 3S the Court differentiated between the level of scienter
necessary in libel actions brought by public figures as compared to
private figures. 36 While a public figure can turn to the media to pro
tect their reputation from false statements, private figures' access to
the media is virtually non-existent. Therefore, as long as they do not
impose strict liability, states may adopt a lower standard than actual
malice for private plaintiffs. 37 Finally, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,38 the Supreme Court held that upon a motion for summary judg
ment, a trial judge must evaluate whether the public figure plaintiff
can show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted
with actual malice. 39 Although the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue of actual malice in the context of quotations, sev
eral related cases have indirectly addressed the issue.
The Supreme Court, in St. Amant v. Thompson,40 elaborated on
the actual malice standard of New York Times. 41 Reckless disregard
for the truth is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent person
would have published the statement, or investigated it before publish
ing.42 Instead, there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclu
sion that the defendant actually doubted the truth ()f the publication.
"Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or
34. Id.
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the plaintiff was a well known lawyer who repre
sented a family bringing a wrongful death action against a Chicago police officer. The
magazine "American Opinion" attacked the credibility of the plaintiff. The magazine de
scribed Gertz as a "Communist-fronter," and falsely implied that he had a criminal record.
Id. at 325-26.
36. Id. at 342-45.
37. Id. at 347.
38. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
39. Id. at 252.
40. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
41. In a televised political speech, St. Amant, a candidate for public office, read both
the questions he had asked a union member and the corresponding responses. One of the
answers falsely charged Thompson, another union member, with criminal conduct. Id. at
728-29. The case was tried before New York Times, and the trial court awarded Thompson
$5,000 in damages. The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the record did
not show that St. Amant had acted with actual malice. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
reversed the appellate court, and held there was sufficient evidence that St. Amant acted
with reckless disregard when deciding whether the statements about Thompson were. true.
Id. The United States Supreme Court held that there was not enough evidence to prove
actual malice. There was no evidence that indicated that St. Amant knew of the probable
falsity of the statement about Thompson. Id. at 730. Furthermore, under the New York
Times doctrine, a failure to investigate alone does not constitute bad faith. Id. at 733.
42. Id. at 731.
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falsity and demonstrates actual malice."43 However, the Court stated
that liability cannot be avoided by a defendant by merely testifying
that he or she published the article "with a belief that the statements
were true."44 For a defendant to avoid liability, a fact-finder must
determine that the publication was made in good faith. Furthermore,
the Court warned that it would not be inclined to find a good faith
belief in the truth of the statements when a story is fabricated or when
there are reasons to doubt its accuracy.45
Moreover, actual malice can be proven by either direct or circum
stantial evidence. For instance, evidence that the defendant was aware
of inconsistent information can support a finding of reckless disregard.
In one case, a court held that there was sufficient evidence of reckless
disregard when the defendant not only republished certain allegations
in the face of strong contradictory information, but also added addi
tional details to increase the credibility of the original statements. 46
Courts may also infer reckless disregard when there were obvious rea
sons for the reporter to doubt the source, or when the reporter had
relied on an inherently ambiguous source. 47
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,48 the
Court differentiated between the necessary proof for actual malice and
mere proof of falsity.49 The Court held that "[t]he burden of proving
43.

Id.
Id. at 732.
45. Id. The Court stated that "[P]rofessions of good faith will be unlikely to prove
persuasive ... where a story is fabricated ... [or] is the product of [a journalist's] imagina
tion ...." Id.
46. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.ld 324, 337 (ld Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1049 (1970).
47. See Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cerro denied,444
U.S. 984 (1979). In Bindrim, the plaintiff claimed that he was libelled in a fictional book.
In affirming the award to the plaintiff, the California Court of Appeals held that "[s]ince
actual malice concentrates solely on defendants' attitude toward the truth or falsity of the
material published, and not on malicious motives," the defendant was in the best position
to have this knowledge of her own material. Id. at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court
found actual malice from the author's knowledge of the real events and the fictional ac
counts presented in her book. Since she attended the therapy sessions fictionalized in the
novel, there could be no doubt that she knew the true facts.
48. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
49. Id. at 511 n.30. In Bose, Consumer Reports published a seven page article which
evaluated the quality of loudspeaker systems. In referring to the plaintiff's product, Con
sumer Reports reported that the sound tended to wander about the room. The plaintiff
claimed that this was a false statement of fact. The defendant moved for summary judg
ment. Relying on the rationale set forth in Time. Inc. V. Pape, the Supreme Court held that
the defendant's resolution was among a number of possible interpretations of an event that
"bristled with ambiguities." Id. at 512-13 (quoting Time, Inc. V. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290
(1971». The statement in Bose represented the type of inaccuracy that is common in the
forum of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies. Id. at 513. The choice
44.
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'actual malice' requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was
false or that he sUbjectively entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of the statement."SO In Bose, the Court held that the defendant's de
scription of the plaintiff's loudspeaker was a rational interpretation of
an ambiguous events l
The Supreme Court, in Harte-Hanks Communications v. Con
naughton,S2 held that reckless disregard is a subjective standard and
there must be sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant acted
with a "high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity."s3 "[A] pub
lic figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from
professional standards. "54 The Court maintained that judges have a
duty to determine independently whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to support a judgment by clear and convincing proof of ac
tual malice. 55
In essence, the actual malice standard enunciated in New York
Times and its progeny provides a reporter with wide latitude to pub
lish without the threat of liability. 56 In Masson v. New Yorker Maga
zine, Inc.,S7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit maintained
that the actual malice standard had not been satisfied when the plain
tiff produced evidence of deliberate falsifications of statements made
within quotations.
of this language. the Court stated, although inaccurate, "does not place the speech beyond
the outer limits of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella." Id.
50. [d. at 511 n.30.
51. [d. at 512-13.
52. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
53. Id. at 2696 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964». In Harte
Hanks, the plaintiff was an unsuccessful candidate for the position of Municipal Judge of
Hamilton, Ohio. Id. at 2681. The defendant, the publisher of a local newspaper, supported
the re-election of the incumbent. Id. About one month before the election, the incum
bent's Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on a bribery charge. [d. at
2681-82. A grand jury investigation ensued. [d. at 2682. The local newspaper, The Jour
nal News, published a story quoting a jury witness as stating that the plaintiff, Con
naughton, "had used 'dirty tricks' and offered her and her sister jobs and a trip to Florida
'in appreciation' for their help in the investigation." Id. Connaughton sued the newspaper
for libel, claiming that the story was published with actual malice. Id.
54. Id. at 2684.
55. Id. at 2695 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 511 (1984».
56. Statistics prove that the defendant in a libel action usually prevails. For actual
statistics, see Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455, 491.
57. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
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MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC 58

In 1983, Janet Malcolm authored a two-part article in The New
Yorker magazine about the termination of psychoanalyst Jeffrey M.
Masson as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives. 59 Mal
colm's article, primarily based upon tape-recorded interviews with
Masson, described his rise to prominence in the field of psychoanaly
sis. Malcolm explained the struggle between Masson and other board
members of the Freud Archives. According to Masson, he was fired
because of his outspoken view that Dr. Freud had suppressed informa
tion concerning sexual abuse of children. 60
In reviewing the prepublication draft of the article, Masson no
ticed that the proposed publication contained several inaccuracies con
cerning his quoted statements. 61 Masson notified the fact-checking
department at The New Yorker magazine of the inaccuracies, claim
ing that his quotations had been altered. He requested that the state
ments attributed to him through quotations be verified. 62 After his
requests were ignored and the article published, Masson filed a libel
suit against the author of the article, Janet Malcolm, and its publish
ers, The New Yorker magazine and Alfred A. Knopf. 63
Masson contended that fabricated quotations and misleadingly
edited statements attributed to him made him appear "unscholarly,
irresponsible, vain, [and] lacking impersonal [sic] honesty and moral
integrity."64 As proof of deliberate fabrication, Masson presented evi
dence showing that several quotations attributed to him were not con
tained in the tape-recorded sessions. 65 The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that Masson
failed to present sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury would find
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1536. The article, entitled "Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the
Archives," was published in a two-part series in The New Yorker magazine. Malcolm's
article was also published in book form by defendant Alfred A. Knopf. For purposes of
this discussion, the term "article" will be used to discuss the libel action brought against
both The New Yorker magazine and Alfred A. Knopf.
60. Id. Masson claimed that Freud had abandoned the "seduction theory," which
hypothesizes that certain medical illnesses originate in sexual abuse during childhood. Id.
Masson claimed that he was fired from his position at the Freud Archives because he pub
licly announced his views that Freud had suppressed the seduction. theory to further his
career and appease his colleagues. Id.
61. Id. at 1537.
62. Id. at 1568.
63. Id. at 1536.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1537.
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actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. 66
Masson subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. He argued that actual malice could be proven from
evidence that Malcolm fabricated quotations attributed to him, and
that prior to pUblication he had alerted the staff at The New Yorker
magazine. 67 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court. For purposes of summary judgment, the
court assumed that all the quotations were deliberately altered, and
held as a matter of law that actual malice could not be established
based on the fabrication. 68
In reaching its decision, the majority noted that neither the
Supreme Court of the United States nor the Supreme Court of Califor
nia had addressed the specific issue of whether actual malice can be
established through evidence of fabricated quotations. 69 Relying on
other state and federal court decisions, the Ninth Circuit established
the current law governing fictionalized quotations. First, and perhaps
most important, the court held that actual malice will not be inferred
if the fabricated quotations are " 'rational interpretations' of ambigu
ous remarks."70 Second, the court stated that fictionalization or dram
atization of conversations are not actionable if the changes "do not
'alter the substantive content' of unambiguous remarks actually
made" by the speaker. 71 Third, the court held that actual malice can
be proved by fabricated quotations only when they are "wholly the
product of the author's imagination."72 The court reviewed the
passages to determine whether actual malice could be inferred. The
court found that the challenged quotations were either rational inter
pretations of ambiguous statements, or did not alter the substantive
content of what Masson actually said. The majority, therefore, denied
66. 686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
67. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1539 (citing Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446 (3d.

.

Cir. 1987».
71. Id. (quoting Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977».
72. Id. (citing Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976». Addi
tionally, Masson claimed that Malcolm took statements out of context, and made it appear
that Masson said the exact opposite of what he actually did. For example, Malcolm deleted
33 out of 40 words in a sentence, changing Masson's meaning to make him say the opposite
of what he actually said. The majority of the court also held that these statements were
non-actionable. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1545-46, 1553.

138

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REYIEW

[Vol. 13:127

Masson relief. 73
Judge Kozinski, in dissent, stated, "[t]he majority and I part com
pany on a simple but fundamental point: the meaning of quota
tions."74 Although he agreed that first amendment freedoms should
be highly protected, Judge Kozinski argued that journalists should not
be given the right to alter quotations deliberately. According to the
dissent, quotations are understood as containing no interpretations by
the writer and by using quotation marks the writer guarantees that he
or she "has interposed no editorial comment, has resolved no ambigui
ties, [and] has added or detracted nothing of substance."7S Further,
Judge Kozinski stated that the rational interpretation doctrine is par
ticularly troublesome in the context of quotations because statements
could vary in content and wording from what was actually said "so
long as the writer can argue with a straight face that it is a rational
interpretation of what the speaker said. "76
Finding the law cited by the majority inapplicable, the dissent
analyzed the policy reasons behind New York Times v. Sullivan and
subsequent cases. 77 The dissent maintained that the rational interpre
tation standard is appropriate only in circumstances when a reporter is
attempting to describe or summarize statements or descriptions. 78
Judge Kozinski, dissatisfied with the majority's application of the ra
tional interpretation standard in the context of quotations, advocated
a five-step inquiry in order to determine whether liability should ensue
from a misquotation. 79

73. Id. at 1548.
74. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1549. According to the dissent, readers give more weight and credibility to
a quotation than to a paraphrase or description. Id.
76. Id. at 1548 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 1557.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1562. The five-step inquiry is:
1. Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of what the speaker
said?
2. Is it inaccurate?
3. Is the inaccuracy material?
4. Is the inaccuracy defamatory?
5. Is the inaccuracy the result of malice?
The defendant would be entitled to a favorable judgment if anyone of these questions
were answered in the negative. Applying this standard to the defendants, Judge Kozinski
would have reversed the summary judgment granted by the district court. Id.
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ANALYSIS

The public looks to the press not only as a forum for divergent
ideas and opinions but, equally important, as a source of accurate
accounts of newsworthy events. Permitting the press intentionally
to disseminate false and defamatory reports with impunity would be
to damage its credibility and ultimately to injure the press as an
institution. 80

The Masson decision did just that.
The majority in Masson led the reader to believe that it merely
followed existing case law. In reality, however, by taking bits and
pieces of prior opinions unrelated to the issues of this case, the major
ity was just as guilty as was Janet Malcolm of taking phrases out of
context. The majority's analysis was flawed for the following reasons.
First, the court interpreted existing case law incorrectly, and therefore,
misapplied the rational interpretation standard enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. Y. Pape. 81 Second, journalistic standards
do not support the Masson decision. This Note advocates the ap
proach taken by the Masson dissent.
A.

Misinterpretation of the Rational Interpretation Standard

Commentators have stated that the actual malice standard must
be employed with caution when quotations are used. 82 Quotations are
used frequently and provide the core of many news articles and edito
rials. Perhaps one of the most common reactions from a person who
has been portrayed less than favorably in print is to allege that they
have been misquoted. 83 However, in the world of journalism, editing
the material is "the rule rather than the exception,"84 especially when
the journalist is dealing with a large number of quoted passages.
Courts should not get involved in determinations of style or editorial
judgments.
In order to protect journalists from liability under certain circum
stances, the Supreme Court established the rational interpretation
standard. In reaching its decision, however, the Masson court relied
on two cases, Time, Inc. Y. Pape 8S and Dunn v. Gannett New York
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 288,426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 284 (1980).
401 U.S. 279 (1971).
See. e.g., R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 67 (1986).
Id.; see also R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at § 3.32.
R. SACK, supra note 82, at 67.
401 U.S. 279 (1971).
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Newspapers,86 neither of which extended the rational interpretation
doctrine to deliberately fabricated quotations. By applying this doc
trine in Masson, the majority distorted the purpose of the rational in
terpretation standard.
Addressing specific issues pertaining to errors of interpretation,
the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Pape 87 established guidelines for
determining whether actual malice may be inferred from evidence
showing misleading editing. InPape, the United States Commission
on Civil Rights issued a study on police brutality. One week later,
Time magazine published an article about the Commission's study.
The Time article described cases of police brutality and contained sev
eral direct quotations from the Commission's report. 8S Specifically,
the article described an alleged racially motivated beating by Officer
Pape, a Chicago police officer. 89 Time magazine failed to indicate that
the charges of police brutality were only allegations in a complaint,
and not independent findings by the Civil Rights Commission. 9O The
Time article made it appear that the Commission report stated that
the beatings had' actually occurred. 91 Both the author of the article
and his research 'assistant admitted that they were aware at the time
the article was published "that the wording of the Commission Report
had been significantly altered, but insisted that its real meaning had
not been changed. "92 Pape sued, claiming that actual malice could be
inferred from the omission of the word "alleged" in the article. 93
The Supreme Court held that the wording of the Commission re
port was ambiguous, and that the magazine's resolution of ambiguities
did not establish actual malice. 94 The Court recognized that a press
report can contain "an almost infinite variety of shadings,"9S and that
the omission of the word "alleged" was valid since it was "one of a
number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled
with ambiguities."96 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that there
was not enough evidence to create a jury issue of actual malice under
86. 833 F.2d 446 (3d. Cir. 1987).
87. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
88. [d. at 282.
89. [d. at 281.
90. [d. at 282. In fact, during the trial Pape called the police officers who had partic.
ipated in the raid to testify. All of the police officers testified that nothing resembling the
events described in the Time magazine article had actually occurred. [d. at 282·83.
91. [d. at 284-85.
92. [d. at 285.
93. See id. at 282·83.
94. [d. at 292.
95. [d. at 286.
96. [d. at 290.
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the New York Times standard of reckless disregard for the truth. 97
Mistakes of this kind, the Court concluded, must be protected under
the first amendment. 98 The Court reasoned that a directed verdict was
appropriate in this circumstance because freedom of speech would be
chilled if a jury determined whether actual malice existed, particularly
where the alleged libel consists of a misinterpretation of a lengthy gov
ernment document. 99 Additionally, journalists would be deterred
from voicing their criticism of official conduct because of the fear and
cost of litigation.
The rational interpretation doctrine established in Pape is based
on a reporter's need to rely on a source which is descriptive. 1oo When
a description is unclear, "a reporter runs the risk of inaccuracy if he
[or she] misunderstands or deliberately chooses one of several possible
interpretations." 101 In such cases, the rational interpretation standard
is a necessary safeguard. Consequently, due to the time constraints
placed upon most journalists, granting a reporter the latitude to
choose from a variety of interpretations appears to be justified. Courts
are not willing, nor should they be willing, to intrude on the choice of
language employed by reporters in such circumstances.
The question that remains, however, is whether reporters should
be given the liberty to choose from a variety of interpretations when
dealing with direct quotations. Pape did not address this issue. Pape
allowed a journalist to select and publish portions of quoted excerpts
from a Civil Rights Commission Report; it did not sanction the use of
invented or altered quotations. 102 Under Pape, a reporter may select
particular passages to quote from, shaping the article by omissions and
inclusions, but he or she is not allowed to alter quoted passages. Fur
thermore, the Supreme Court warned lower courts that the decision in
Pape was limited to the specific facts of the case, and that "[n]either
lies nor false communication serves the ends of the First Amendment,
97.
98.

]d.

Id. at 292. A few years later the Supreme Court extended its approval of the
rational interpretation doctrine in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc .•
466 U.S. 485 (1984). For a discussion of Bose, see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of Bose, see Note. The Future ofLibel Law and Independent
Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc .•
71 CoRNELL L. REv. 477 (1986).
99. Pape. 401 U.S. at 291.
100. Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247,
290 (1985).
101. Id.
102. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1557 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. granted, III S. Ct. 39 (1990).
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and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation."t03 By
extending the rational interpretation standard to quotations, the Mas
son court has indirectly furthered the proliferation of lies.
In fact, insofar as the facts in Masson and Pape are similar, the
analysis in Pape supports the proposition that journalists should not be
protected by the first amendment for deliberate alterations of quota
tions. In Pape, the court of appeals concluded that the omission of the
word "allegation" was a falsification of the report. t04 The malice re
quirement might be reasonably inferred, the court stated, from the de
liberate and conscious omission of the word "alleged."tOS Therefore,
the issue of malice was for the jury. 106 Referring to the decision of the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court in Pape stated that "[a]nalysis of
this kind may be adequate when the alleged libel purports to be an
eyewitness or other direct account of events that speak for
themselves." 107
In contrast to the Commission report in Pape, although Masson's
meaning might have been ambiguous, his tape-recorded statements
were not. The article in Masson purported to be a direct account of
events that speak for themselves-Masson's own words. Thus, Pape
seems to indicate that Masson should be entitled to a jury determina
tion on the issue of actual malice.
The Masson court also relied heavily on the Third Circuit's ap
proach to libel in the context of quotations in Dunn v. Gannett New
York Newspapers. lOs Dunn involved a libel action brought by the
mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey as a result of statements published in
a Spanish language daily newspaper.l09 During a campaign debate,
the mayor commented on the city's litter problem. I to A Spanish news
paper headline, translated into English, read "Elizabeth Mayor on the
103. Pape, 401 u.s. at 292 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732
(1968».
104. Id. at 285.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 446.
110. Id. at 448. The mayor stated:
But litter, of course, is an ever growing problem because we are a very busy, a
growing city.... You have a lot of new people moving into the City of Elizabeth,
some coming from foreign lands where abject poverty was something they lived
with everyday ... and it will take a great deal of time for some of them to respect
the rights and properties of other people, and above all, to respect a city that
offers them a home in what I consider to be a wholesome environment.
Id.
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attack: CALLS HISPANICS 'PIGS.' "111 The mayor argued that by
enclosing the Spanish word, "cerdos" in single quotation marks, the
newspaper made it appear that the mayor had used the word "pigs"
when discussing the litter problem. The mayor contended that actual
malice could be inferred since the "pigs" quote was fabricated, and the
defendant newspaper knew that the headline was an exaggeration.
Claiming that the quotation marks were used to indicate that the word
was used in a figurative sense, the defendant introduced evidence that
the "use of quotation marks in Spanish does not necessarily signify
that a literal quotation is intended."1l2 Consequently, the court of ap
peals affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants granted by
the district court. 113
The Masson court inaccurately interpreted Dunn to support the
conclusion that a deliberately altered statement made within quotation
marks is not evidence of actual malice. Dunn does not stand for this
proposition. Rather, the Third Circuit in Dunn addressed the narrow
issue of actual malice as applied to a translation from Spanish to Eng
lish. Additionally, because quotation marks in Spanish are not
equivalent to those in English, the Masson analysis is not supported by
Dunn. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that, at
most, Dunn's evidence showed that the defendant mischaracterized
the mayor's remarks. The court was unwilling to find actual malice
based solely on the Spanish-to-English translation of the language
used by the newspaper, and was convinced that the word "cerdos" was
a "fair, albeit inadequate, translation" of the mayor's remarks. 1l4 The
defendant was granted summary judgment in Dunn because Dunn
failed to present any countervailing evidence of actual malice. Again,
the Masson facts are different. The plaintiff presented evidence of
tape-recorded interviews that clearly proved that Janet Malcolm delib
erately altered statements placed within quotations. Thus, Dunn is in
apposite, and does not support the majority's approach in Masson.
The rational interpretation standard is appropriate when a re
porter is summarizing a report, as in Pape, or translating a speech, as
in Dunn. The rational interpretation standard is appropriate under
these circumstances because the original statements themselves were
ambiguous. The journalist in Dunn chose an interpretation, and the
reader was not left with the Unpression that these exact words were
111. Id.
112. Id. at 451.
113. Id. at 455.
114. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
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spoken. The result is different when direct quotations are utilized.
When the journalist is directly quoting from tape-recorded interviews,
it is inappropriate to apply the rational interpretation standard to quo
tations because the issues of ambiguity, summarization, or translation
do not apply.
Applying the rational interpretation standard to quotations con
flicts with the purposes of the actual malice standard. For example, a
contested passage in Malcolm's article referred to Masson's relation
ship with two other members of the Freud Archives, Anna Freud and
Dr. Eissler. In the article, Malcolm quoted Masson as stating that
"[Anna Freud and Dr. Eissler] loved to hear from me what creeps and
dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo-you get your plea
sure from him, but you don't take him out in public."lIS This passage
was not found in the tape recordings. Rather, the transcripts show
that Masson's actual words were:
[I]n a sense, I ... was a private asset but a public liability. They
like [sic] me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk
and chat and tell them the truth about things .... But that I was, in
a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these
important training analysts to be caught dead with me. 116

Applying the rational interpretation standard to this passage, the ma
jority held that actual malice could not be inferred because the use of
the descriptive term "intellectual gigolo" was a rational interpretation
of Masson's comments. 117
Masson's actual statements are different from the quo~ation Mal
colm reported in both tone and content. Masson's statements were
sufficiently clear that they did not need any further interpretation.
There is a difference between the principle that a defendant may select
from various interpretations of the "truth" and a principle that allows
conscious manipulation of the "truth" by a journalist. One commen
tator noted that at some point the journalist distorts the meaning to
such an extent as to create a jury issue of actual malice. lIS
The meaning of a statement placed within quotations stands for
itself and requires no additional interpretation. According to the dis
115. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. granted, III S. Ct. 39 (1990).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1541. Judge Kozinski explains, "[b]eing too junior to be taken seriously is
quite different from being a public embarrassment; one suggests that Masson is a young
man with potential, the other makes him out to be a clown." Id. at 1552 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
118. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, § 3.20[3], at 3-54.
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sent in Masson, readers give more weight to direct quotations than to
descriptive passages. Judge Kozinski explained this phenomenon,
stating that experienced writers use direct quotations "as if to say:
'[slee here, don't just take my word for it, he said it himself.' "119 In
the present case, Malcolm invented words and then ascribed them to
Masson. Masson's tape-recorded statements did not need any rational
interpretation because Malcolm had available to her a completely ac
curate source of what was actually said. It was for the reader, not
Janet Malcolm, to draw his or her own conclusions and interpret Mas
son's actual remarks. 120 If Malcolm felt compelled to publish her in
terpretation of her conversations with Masson, she could have
published that interpretation without deceiving the reader into believ
ing that the statements were Masson's actual words. Malcolm had the
option of paraphrasing the conversations, thus signalling to the reader
that Malcolm's article was her own "rational interpretation" of her
conversations with Masson.
.
There is a need to grant a reporter some degree of literary license.
A journalist is often faced with pressures such as time constraints
when a story has an immediate deadline. A reporter's interviews are
frequently unscheduled, and invariably reporters do not have enough
time or resources to investigate and check the accuracy of the story.
Because of the nature of the newsgathering process, a reporter is pro
tected from inadvertent or negligent mistakes under New York Times,
and is given the necessary latitude under Pape to interpret an ambigu
ous statement. None of these difficulties are present when the reporter
has a verbatim tape of the statements to be used in the article. In this
situation, fabricating statements placed in quotation marks is
unwarranted.
B.

Masson's Misinterpretation of Existing Case Law Concerning
Fabricated Quotations-Carson v. Allied News Co. 121

In addition to misinterpreting the rational interpretation stan
dard, the Masson majority also misapplied other existing case law.
The majority ignored the reasoning which governed the Seventh Cir
cuit's decision in Carson v. Allied News Co., 122 a case factually more
similar to Masson than either Pape or Dunn. Carson involved an ac
119. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1549 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
120. According to the dissent, minor changes in a quotation can have major effects,
and the skilled writer can alter the reader's perception far more effectively than if she had
disclosed her editorial role. Id.
121. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
122. Id.
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tion by Johnny Carson of "The Tonight Show" television program
against the defendant's tabloid. The defendant published an article
stating that "The Tonight Show" was moving from the East Coast to
the West Coast, in order for Carson to "be closer to the woman' who
broke up his marriage."123 Part of the article concerned an alleged
struggle between Carson and National Broadcasting Co. executives,
and contained statements by Carson to the executives and the execu
tives' responses and reactions. 124 The defendant never interviewed or
spoke with Carson. Rather, the defendant-writer claimed that while
he had fabricated the conversations, these fabrications were justified
because the quoted conversations were logical extensions of the facts
of a previous story.12'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the grant
of summary judgment and maintained that by imagining the "facts,"
the defendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the state
ments."126 The court stated:
In the catalogue of responsibilities of journalists, right next to
plagiarism, . . . must be a canon that a journalist does not invent
quotations and attribute them to actual persons. If a writer can sit
down in the quiet of his cubicle and create conversations as "a logi
cal extension of what must have gone on" and dispense this as news,
it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment protection such fic
tion can claim. 127

The Masson court improperly limited the Carson holding to stand for
the proposition that a fact finder may infer malice from a fabricated
quotation only when the language is wholly the product of the author's
imagination. The Ninth Circuit decision would have enabled Mal
colm to "sit down in the quiet of [her] cubicle, and create conversa
tions as 'a logical extension of what must have gone on.' "128 Under
the unwarranted extension of the rational interpretation standard,
Malcolm was able to accomplish what was prohibited by the Seventh
Circuit in Carson.
The underlying rationale for not protecting deliberately altered
quotations is that they are not worthy of first amendment protection.
If the invented quotations at issue in Carson were not worthy of first
amendment protection, then the invented quotations in Masson cer
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

[d. at 212. The source of the quote was Joanna Holland, Carson's second wife.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 213.
[d. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968».
See id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968».
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tainly should not be. The Supreme Court recognized the difference
between honest error and fabrication and stated in Garrison v.

Louisiana: 129
The use of calculated falsehood . . . would put a different cast
on the constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if
inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.l30
The Masson majority departed from the Supreme Court's rationale in
Garrison. The purpose of the actual malice standard enunciated in
New York Times is to encourage speech on issues of public concern,
not to protect the media from deliberate and conscious manipulation
of speech, whether that speech is placed within quotations or not. The
actual malice standard was established to protect the media from self
censorship and from errors that are inevitable in free debate. 131 False
statements are only protected if honestly made. 132 A contrary rule in
Masson would not result in self-censorship; rather, it would promote
accurate, precise, and honest journalism. The type of intentional ma
nipulation that Malcolm engaged in is closer to the "calculated false
hood" of Garrison 133 than to the type of inevitable error examined in
New York Times.l 34 Because Malcolm's fabrications were deliberate,
she should not have been given protection under the standard stated in

New York Times.
Furthermore, the Masson court's distinction between fabricated
quotations which are wholly the product of the writer's imagination,
and those which depart significantly from the speaker's remarks is
nonsensical given the purpose of the actual malice standard. Under
the Masson court's analysis, a deceptive journalist can avoid liability
by fabricating ninety-nine percent of a conversation placed in quota
tions, and adding one sentence from what the speaker actually said.
Because the conversation is not wholly the product of the author's
imagination, the fact finder would never be allowed to determine
whether the journalist acted with actual malice. If a jury issue of ac
tual malice existed in Carson, then there should be one in Masson as
well. Additionally, Masson contends that insofar as Malcolm did
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Id. at 75.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 280 (1964).
Id. at 278.
379 U.S. 64.
376 U.S. 254.
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fabricate the language attributed to him, it was wholly the product of
Malcolm's imagination. Because Masson presented significant evi
dence of alteration of his statements and fabrication of quotations,
summary judgment was inappropriate even under the majority's view
of Carson.
C.

Journalistic Ethics

The Supreme Court has steadily expanded an author's protection
regarding articles about public officials, public figures, and matters of
public concern. 13S In fact, statistics prove that in the vast majority of
cases, the defendant is ultimately successful in a libel action. 136 Ethi
cal journalists do not need the additional protection of the rational
interpretation standard in the context of quotations. The Masson
court improperly decided that the press should not have to ~ the
burden of making sure that what they put in quotation marks is accu
rate. This is not a heavy burden to place on journalists, who are in the
best position to verify the accuracy of the quoted passages. In Mas
son's case, all Malcolm (or The New Yorker, for that matter) had to
do was replay the tape of Malcolm's conversations with Masson to
verify the stat6ments attributed to him. No doubt this job is cumber
some, but it is not excessively burdensome if it will protect a reporter
from liability. Failing to verify the statements attributed to Masson
following notification that the statements may have been fabricated
should have been evidence of actual malice.
Journalists are confronted with ethical decisions in almost every
aspect of the editing process. 137 In order to have some criteria of pro
fessionalism in the field of journalism, reporters rely heavily on a code
of ethics. The foundation of one typical code of ethics is accuracy,
objectivity, and good faith.138 Such a code of ethics establishes some
135. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058-62 (11th ed. 1985).
136. Most jury verdicts for plaintiffs in a defamation action are overturned on ap
peal. Federal courts have reversed approximately seventy percent of the libel judgments
won by plaintiffs which involved actual malice. Note, First Amendment: Tavoulareas v.
Piro: An Extensive Exercise 0/ Independent Judgment, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 854, 854
n.l (1988); see also Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789 (1986) (overall success rate for plaintiffs through a
judgment was ten percent); Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study 0/ De/amation
Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455; Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A
Critique 0/ Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1983) (At the summary
judgment stage, media defendants are successful in almost 75% of their efforts to have their
cases dismissed before trial. Plaintiffs who sue the media are awarded judgments in ap
proximately five to ten percent of all libel cases.).
137. See M. CULLEN, MASS MEDIA & THE FiRST AMENDMENT 335 (1981).
138. Id. at 336.
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guidelines for the journalist. These guidelines include:
1.
2.
3.
6.

Truth is our ultimate goal.
Objectivity in reporting the news is another goal which serves
as the mark of an experienced professional.
There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness.
Partisanship in editorial comment which knowingly departs
from the truth violates the spirit of American journalism. 139

Malcolm violated the spirit of journalistic ethics by fabricating quota
tions, and the Ninth Circuit condoned this breach by providing Mal
colm with the benefit of the rational interpretation standard.
According to The Associated Press Stylebook and Libel Manual,
another source heavily relied upon by journalists, quotation marks are
used "[t]o surround the exact words of a speaker or writer when re
ported in a story."I40 In determining when to use full quotes as com
pared to partial quotes, the Stylebook states, "[i]f a speaker's words
are clear and concise, favor the full quote. If cumbersome language
can be paraphrased fairly, use an indirect construction, reserving quo
tation marks for sensitive or controversial passages that must be iden
tified specifically as coming from the speaker."141 Thus, even
journalistic standards do not adhere to the Masson standard that al
lows a journalist to consciously manipulate quotations.
A court is not required to base its decisions on journalistic stan
dards. However, the standards that journalists impose upon them
selves can be valuable to a court in evaluating any given journalist'S
actions. As Judge Kozinski explained: "[t]ruth is a journalist'S stock
in trade. To invoke the right to deliberately distort what someone else
has said is to assert the right to lie in print. . . . Masson has lost his
case, but the defendants, and the profession to which they belong,
have lost far more."142 The court is in effect allowing Malcolm to
change not only the meaning of the statements made by Masson, but
also the concept behind quotations. No warning was given to the
reader that these were not Masson's exact words. The reasonable
reader of Malcolm's article would likely have drawn the conclusion
that Masson used the exact words ascribed to him since that is the
139. Id.
140. THE AssociATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL 183 (1980) (empha
sis added).
141. Id. at 184.
142. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine. Inc .• 895 F.2d 1535. 1570 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski. J. dissenting). cert. granted. III S. Ct. 39 (1990).
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meaning of a quotation in a non-fiction piece. 143 In other words, the
reader of Malcolm's article was not informed that, in effect, he or she
was reading fiction.
D.

The Dissent's Approach-The Central Meaning Standard

Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the Masson ap
proach is that it fails to provide journalists, lawyers, and judges with a
clear standard to determine liability. Masson does not provide any
predictability or stability in the context of deliberately altered quota
tions because the writer could differ dramatically in what he or she
considers a rational interpretation.
However, there are several reasons why a court should not adopt
a rule that deliberate fabrications of quotations are, as a matter of law,
evidence of actual malice. There are situations in which a journalist
may change grammar and diction, yet remain true to the meaning of
the quote. l44 In reality, it is not always possible to be literally accu
rate. 14S Many journalists adhere to the practice that a quote can be
considered acceptable if it honestly reflects what the speaker said. l46
Additionally, verbatim transcripts can prove to be embarrassing to the
speaker because many people make poor word choices, and use ram
bling and incomplete sentences. 147 In this situation, minor alteration
of a quotation is acceptable. Conversely, there are circumstances in
which the alteration of a quotation is viewed as questionable.
The dissent's five-part analysis strikes a balance between the ma
jority's approach in Masson, and a per se rule of liability. Judge
Kozinski's approach can be viewed as the traditional approach to the
determination of liability in a libel claim. The dissent began its analy
sis with the proposition that "what somebody says is a fact, and that
doctoring a quotation is no more protected by the first amendment
than is any other falsification."148 Judge Kozinski's five-step inquiry
then asked:
143. See Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About Troublesome
Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 355, 361 (1985).
144. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558-59 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing M. CHARNLEY &
B. CHARNLEY, REPORTING 248 (4th ed. 1979); J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S Mo
TIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1976) ("(m]ost of the newspaper
codes or canons tend to stress literal accuracy when quoting news sources"».
145. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558.
146. Id. (citing J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF
THE NEWS MEDIA 70-71 (1976».
147. Id. at 1559 (citing J. OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 100 (1988».
148. Id. at 1562.
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(1) Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

what the speaker said?
If so, is it inaccurate?
If so, is the inaccuracy material?
If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory?
If so, is the inaccuracy the result of malice, i. e., is it a fabri
cation or was it committed in reckless disregard of the truth?149

Accordingly, if any of these questions are answered in the negative,
the inquiry terminates and the defendant prevails as a matter oflaw.l so
If all of these questions could be answered affirmatively, then the issue
would be one for the jury to determine. Under such a standard, Mas
son's case would be sent to the jury. lSI
The approach taken by the dissent in Masson is preferable to the
one chosen by the majority. The first question resolves the problem of
when an author is using quotes not to represent a speaker's actual
words, but for a literary purpose. 1S 2 An example of this is a hypotheti
cal conversation, where quotations are used explicitly to convey the
journalist's thoughts, not the speaker's verbatim words. Some journal
ists forewarn the reader in the beginning of the article that the quota
tion marks do not represent the speaker's actual words.1S3 Under
these circumstances, it is reasonable not to hold the journalist liable
because the reader is expected to understand that the passage is not
verbatim, but rather that the author is using a rhetorical device. 1S4
The second inquiry asks whether the quotes are inaccurate. At
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The dissent discusses the school ofthought known as "New Journalism" which
advocates the view that a joumalist is entitled to vary or rearrange the facts of a story in
order to advance a literary purpose. However, this type ofjournalism is very controversial,
and has been attacked by many journalists. Writer John Hersey stated:
[T]here is one sacred rule ofjournalism. The writer must not invent. The legend
on the license must read: NONE OF THIS WAS MADE UP. The ethics of
journalism ... must be based on the simple truth that every journalist knows the
difference between the distortion that comes from subtracting observed data and
the distortion that comes from adding invented data.
Id. at 1559·60 n.14. (citing Hersey, The Legend on the License, THE YALE REv., Autumn
1980, at I, 2).
153. Id. at 1563. In Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, the issue was whether it
was reasonable for a reader to understand that the quoted passage was not verbatim. 42
Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
The court held that although the defendant used quotation marks, he was not purporting to
quote the plaintiff. "Instead, ... [the defendant] explicitly qualified the disputed statement
by warning the reader that he was not reporting a fact but only giving his 'impression.' "
Id. Itt 263, 721 P.2d at 92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
154. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1563 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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this stage, the court should compare what the speaker said with what
he or she is reported as having said. ISS If the situation involves a
translation, or a partially inaudible statement, then the journalist may
have to make an editorial judgment as to what was actually said. ls6
Absent reckless or deliberate fabrication, deference must be given to
the writer's choice of words. ls7 Accordingly, in Masson's case, the
quotes can be considered inaccurate because Malcolm did not claim
that the statements were inaudible, and they certainly were not being
translated from another language. ISS
The third question to be answered is whether the inaccuracies are
material. Cosmetic changes that attempt to keep the speaker from
looking foolish are not material as they do not substantively change
what the speaker said. ls9 However, if the inaccuracies are more than a
cosmetic change, the alteration should be found to be material. l60
The fourth question is whether the alterations were defama
tory. 161 This is a basic requirement in a libel case. The evidence ofthe
misquotations that "paint Masson as a vain, shallow, disingenuous,
intellectually dishonest, cold, heartless, self-absorbed individual"162 is
sufficient for the jury to find the quotes defamatory.
Finally, the fifth inquiry is whether the alterations were the result
of malice. 163 Thus, in the present case, the question that must be an
swered is whether the defendants knew that Masson's statements were
different from those attributed to him, or whether the defendants acted
with reckless disregard of the truth. l64 In Malcolm's case, there was
strong circumstantial evidence of actual malice. Malcolm was not on
a deadline to get the story published. '6s Therefore, she could have
easily verified the statements placed within quotations. Furthermore,
many passages that she attributed to Masson were nearly identical to
the taped passages, except that key words were added, deleted, or
changed. '66 Additionally, there was at least one instance that con
tained direct evidence that Malcolm had engaged in deliberate
ISS.
156.
157.
158.
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1564.

at 1565.

at 1566.
at 1567.
at 1566.
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fabrication. 167
Under the dissent's approach, The New Yorker magazine could
also be found to have acted with actual malice. A jury could infer
recklessness when Masson notified The New Yorker of the inaccura
cies in the quoted passages, and The New Yorker failed to respond. 168
Further, a jury could consider The New Yorker's reputation for
"scrupulous accuracy" in order to determine whether it had acted
recklessly.169 Because of this status, readers of The New Yorker rea
sonably expect accuracy in reporting, and "are more likely to accept at
face value the quotes they read in New Yorker articles."170 Under this
analysis, the Masson case would have been heard by the jury.l7l
The dissent's approach and reasoning is more closely related to
the principles of New York Times and its progeny. However, one dan
ger exists. It is important for other courts to avoid incorporating the
rational interpretation standard into quotes within this five-part test.
In order to avoid this dilemma, courts should be careful to limit the
third inquiry, whether the fabrication is material. l72 Immaterial alter
ations should apply only to changes in diction and grammar. Any
thing else should be considered a material alteration, and the
determination of liability should be a jury question.
While the majority in Masson improperly advocates a rational in
terpretation standard, the dissent accurately recommends a "central
meaning" standard. 173 The altered quote must honestly reflect what
the speaker said; if not, the jury should determine whether the journal
ist acted with actual malice. In the context of an altered quotation,
under the central meaning standard, if the speaker's words are ambig
uous, the statements cannot "be altered to remove the ambiguity be
167. Id. at 1567. This fabrication involved Masson's discussion of renovating Anna
Freud's house. Masson said: "it's dark and somber and nothing went on in there. Boy, I
was going to renovate it and open it up, and the sun would come in and there would be
people and-Well, that's what it needs, but it is an incredible storehouse. I mean the li
brary...." Id.
Malcolm's typed draft stated, "Sun would have come pouring in, people would have
come, there would have been parties and laughter and fun." This sentence is crossed out,
and handwriting above it reads, "Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholar
ship, but it would also have been a place of sex, women, fun." Id. This evidence would be
enough for the jury to infer that the deliberate effort to distort what Masson said was made
in reckless disregard of the truth. Id.
168. Id. at 1568-69.
169. Id. at 1569.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1562.
172. Id. at 1564.
173. Id. at 1559 n.12.
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cause that would change the spirit of what the speaker said."174 In
contrast, under the rational interpretation standard, the writer is given
the discretion to choose a rational interpretation of what was actually
said.17S Because the vast majority of journalists and readers believe
that a quotation stands for the speaker's verbatim words, the journalist
should not be given the wide discretion to choose a "rational" inter
pretation. To prevent this abuse, courts should adopt the dissent's ap
proach, with the caveat that most substantial changes should be
viewed as material alterations. Furthermore, unless the altered quota
tion reflects the central meaning of the speaker's words, the decision of
liability should rest with the jury.
CONCLUSION

The underlying rationale of New York Times and its progeny do
not support the conclusion that first amendment protection should be
given to deliberately calculated falsehoods. Neither journalists nor
proponents of the first amendment can view the decision in Masson as
a victory, for it casts a shadow of doubt upon the journalist's profes
sion. The court moved beyond the rationale of New York Times when
it applied the rational interpretation standard to deliberate misquota
tions. If Masson becomes the rule, whenever "the reasonable reader"
encounters a passage containing a quote, there will be some doubt as
to its accuracy. No reader will ever know when the actual speaker is
speaking, or when the author, using "rhetorical license," is changing
the meaning of the speaker's statement.
The majority's holding is inconsistent with both existing case law
and, more importantly, with the policies of the first amendment as
applied to libel law. There is no rational reason why the court should
have extended first amendment protection to deliberately altered
quotes. As one journalist noted, the Masson decision "is a case of bad
journalism making bad law."176
Maureen E. Walsh

174.
175.
176.
21, 1989,

Id.
Id.
Taylor, How Janet Malcolm Won a License to Lie, 15 Conn. L. Tribune, Aug.
at 22, col. 2.

